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The paradox of the Liar, “What I am now saying is false,” has 
been the subject of extensive discussion throughout the history 
of philosophy, but only in the twentieth century has it been 
refined in the form of the Strengthened Liar: “What I am now 
saying is either false or neither true nor false.” Thus the 
very acceptance of one kind of solution to the Liar paradox has 
been seen to involve the construction of new paradoxes -- hardly 
a desirable situation, when the main alternatives seem to involve 
the complete rejection of self-reference and the acceptance of 
rigidly-demarcated levels of language. The Paradox of the Liar, 
edited by R. L. Martin, is the record of a conference held in 
Buffalo, New York in 1969 in order to present and discuss recent 
work on the paradox of the Liar, particularly in its strength- 
ened form, and, it was hoped, to provide some solutions. The 
book includes the three main papers, given by Van Fraassen, 
Skyrms , and Martin, together with various comments and replies, 
some of which themselves amount to substantial papers. It also 
contains a very witty introductory paper by A. R. Anderson and 
an excellent introduction by the editor in which the main lines 
of the succeeding discussion are sketched with admirable clarity 
and economy. Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from the 
book is that the ghost of the Liar can never completely be laid 
to rest, but all the participants in the conference make a laud- 
able attempt at showing us why this should be the case. 
As one might expect, the central theme is the nature of truth 
itself, and various refinements and extensions of our normal 
concept of truth are presented. Pollock, in a very interesting 
and subtle paper, takes as his starting point the distinction 
between the predicate use of ‘true,’ as in “What he said is 
true,” and the operator use, as in “It is true that it is going 
to rain.” The latter use does not give rise to paradoxes, and 
may be regarded as basic. He argues that the problem of the 
Strengthened Liar arises from not taking the above distinction 
seriously enough, and he shows that definitions of the predicate 
use of ‘true’ may fail because they cross types, i.e., go from 
the use of a sentence to the mention of a sentence, in such a 
way that one can no longer determine whether the Liar sentence 
has the predicate as defined. As a result, the Liar sentence is 
meaningless and the Strengthened Liar cannot get off the ground, 
since if even part of a sentence is meaningless this vitiates 
the whole. However, he does not wish to rule out type-crossing 
definitions, and he examines two ways of constructing such 
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definitions which will allow us to use ‘true’ as a predicate 
while avoiding paradoxes. He concludes that we can either retain 
the principle t’cPc is true if and only if P” and have a single 
truth predicate for meaningful sentences alone, or we can 
abandon the principle and have a global truth predicate whose 
range of reference is not limited. In the latter case, the Liar 
sentence turns out to be false. 
Wider, but less plausible extensions of our concept of truth 
are offered by Kearns and Herzberger. Kearns claims that our 
concepts of truth and falsity are incorrigibly vague, in the 
sense that our criteria are inadequate for determining whether 
they are applicable in every case; and he offers us an open-ended 
series of stronger concepts of truth, so that if we say of the 
Liar sentence that it is not true we are saying something other 
than what it says of itself. Presumably at each level we have 
a concept which is less vague than the one it embraces, but we 
will never reach a level at which we have a concept of truth 
whose criteria of application are fully adequate, and thus we 
can have no global concept of truth. The main problem with this 
solution is that the notion of vagueness, and the related notion 
of a borderline case, are themselves vague. Certainly we can 
understand these notions in the case of such predicates as ‘red’ 
and ‘orange,’ or ‘good’ and ‘bad.’ We recognize that we may be 
unable to classify the colour of an object, because colours 
seem to merge into one another, and because our colour concepts 
are not precise enough to make clear-cut distinctions; we 
recognize that we may be unable to decide whether a man is good 
or bad, because he may have both good qualities and bad qualities; 
but we do not expect those analogies to apply to true and false 
sentences. Certainly the Liar sentence is problematic, but it 
seems strange to call it a borderline case. Its problem is not 
that it falls between the camps of truth and falsity, but that 
it seems to belong to both camps at once. 
Herzberger extends our notion of truth by arguing that a 
distinction ought to be drawn between security, or correspondence 
to reality, on the one hand, and the satisfaction of presupposi- 
tions on the other, and that one ought to say that a sentence is 
true only if it satisfies both these conditions. He spells out 
the consequences of the separation of truth from security in an 
elaborate formal system which involves three values, two kinds 
of connectives (‘internal’ and ‘external’), and the use of a new 
operator (‘the Bochvar-Frege horizontal I). He shows how one can 
construct a language L which can record the truth-value of its 
own sentences, and another language L+ which can also record 
that some sentences have no truth-value, but he argues that one 
cannot construct a language which can express the whole of its 
own semantic theory. In his languages it turns out that logical 
principles are secure, but their instances are not necessarily 
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true; and he suggests that the semantic presuppositions of our 
language may themselves be secure rather than true. There are 
three features of this very interesting series of suggestions 
that worry me. In the first place, and most importantly, the 
notion of security itself needs far more explication than 
Herzberger gives. In the second place, L+ has some undesirable 
logical features, such as the non-transitivity of consequence. 
In the third place, Herzberger’s use of Buridan is misleading. 
He ascribes the distinction between security and the satisfaction 
of presuppositions to Buridan in his discussion of insolubilia; 
yet in the passage of Buridan which he quotes, Buridan is dis- 
cussing not insolubilia, but such sentences as “No proposition 
is negative.” Buridan’s puzzlement in the face of this sentence 
was caused by his assumption that a propositio was an occurrent 
sentence, and he solved his problem by distinguishing between 
“signifying that things are as they are” and “being true,” where 
truth was a property just of occurrent sentences. The notion of 
a presupposition is not used here; nor does he seem to use it in 
his later discussion of genuine paradoxes of the Liar type. 
Herzberger’s paper raises another issue which is of some 
importance when one considers the paradox of the Liar: that is, 
how far is the development and study of formal languages of any 
importance? Pollock, Kearns and Martin all emphasize the point 
that the paradox arises in ordinary language, and that it 
involves ordinary language concepts, such as truth. Moreover, 
any satisfactory solution to the paradox, or any account of how 
it arises, must relate to the nature of the language we speak. 
That they are right can, I think, be demonstrated by a close 
look at two of the other papers in the book. Van Fraassen, who 
begins with a brief sketch of the notions of presupposition and 
supervaluation that he developed in earlier papers, devotes the 
substantive part of his paper to variants of a formalized lan- 
guage in which some paradoxes can be generated, though the non- 
truth of a certain kind of infinite paradox cannot be expressed. 
While what he does is impressive, it does not seem to shed new 
light upon the pathology of the Liar in ordinary language; nor 
does it add to the solutions he had offered earlier to the effect 
that both the Liar and the Strengt,hened Liar sentences lack a 
truth-value, and that the claim that assertions of truth are 
always themselves either true or false is mistaken. Skyrms in 
his paper departs even further from ordinary language than does 
Van Fraassen. Building on his earlier solution to the Liar 
paradox which involved restrictions on the substitutivity of 
identity, he sketches out a possible quantificational system 
with weakened Universal Specification. In particular, he dis- 
cusses various ways of barring the Strengthened Liar sentence, 
such as restricting relettering, modifying the theory of 
identity, or introducing a special rule about bound variables 
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occurring both within and without quotation marks in conjunction 
with semantic predicates. These matters carry us some distance 
from the problem of how to handle the semantics of English, or 
any other natural language. 
The most plausible paper in the book is that by the editor, 
R. L. Martin. Martin does indeed set up a modest formalized 
language, but he does not lose himself in its intricacies, for 
he clearly views it as an aid to exposition rather than an end 
in itself. Nor does he set out to refurbish our notion of truth. 
Instead, he develops the notion of a predicate’s range of appli- 
cability in such a way that certain sentences can be ruled out 
as semantically deviant on the grounds that their subject cannot 
be shown to belong to the range of applicability of the predicate. 
In the case of the Liar sentence, ‘This very sentence’ can only 
be shown to belong to the range of applicability of the predicate 
‘false’ if the sentence is first shown not to be semantically 
deviant, yet the sentence can only be shown not to be semanti- 
cally deviant if the subject is shown to belong to the range of 
applicability of the predicate. After some debate with Donnellan, 
Martin deals with the Strengthened Liar sentence by arguing that 
if the same term appears in each disjunct and if one disjunct 
lacks a truth-value, then so does the whole disjunction. In his 
formalized language no open atomic sentence can be satisfied by 
exactly the set of non-true expressions, and this, he claims, 
captures our intuition that exclusion negation cuts across 
category lines. We can say that a sentence is without a truth- 
value, and hence is neither true nor false, but we cannot say 
that a sentence is not true in the sense that it is either false 
or without a truth-value. “False” must appear with its category 
mate, “true.” 
The Paradox of the Liar is not always an easy book to read, 
partly because the authors have a tendency to make elliptical 
references to earlier work of their own and of the other parti- 
cipants in the conference, but it must nevertheless be strongly 
recommended. Not only does it give a thought-provoking and 
comprehensive treatment of the subject in its present condition, 
but it offers tantalizing hints of possible future developments. 
